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A basic objective of the Faculty Association of Utah State 
University, in the words of its constitution, is: 
to encourage intellectual growth and development of its mem-
bers by sponsoring and arranging for the publication of two 
annual faculty ~esearch lectures in the fields of ( 1) the biological 
and exact sciences, including engineering, called the Annual 
Faculty Honor Lecture in the Natural Sciences; and (2) the 
humanities and social sciences, including education and business 
administration, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in 
the Humanities. 
The administration of the University is sympathetic with these 
aims and shares, through the Scholarly Publications Committee, the 
costs of publishing and distributing these lectures. 
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty 
Association. Among the factors considered by the committee in choos-
ing lecturers are, in the words of the constitution: 
( 1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; (2) 
publication of research through recognized channels in the field 
of the proposed lecture; (3) outstanding teaching over an ex-
tended period of years; (4) personal influence in developing the 
character of the students. 
T. Y. Booth was selected by the committee to deliver the Annual 
Faculty Honor Lecture in the Humanities. On behalf of the members 
of the Association we are happy to present Professor Booth's paper: 
The Supreme Organ of the Mind's Self-Ordering Growth 
Committee on Faculty Honor Lecture 
The Supreme Organ of the 
Mind's Self-Ordering 
Growth 
T. Y. Booth 
An English teacher complained not long ago in one of the official 
journals of the National Council of Teachers of English, College 
English, that " ... the NCTE, like the Dartmouth Conference, pro-
ceeds as if 1. A. Richards had never existed .... '" Since this article 
says very well a good many things that many of us in English think 
need saying these days, and since Richards thinks about the problems 
of creating and interpreting language perhaps as deeply as anyone in 
our time, it occurred to me that I could perhaps do no better for this 
lecture than to proceed as if 1. A. Richards indeed does exist, and 
try to explain a little of why I think it is important for everyone, 
starting but by no means ending with teachers of English, to be able 
to look at matters from the viewpoints which he provides. We need 
to bear in mind continually the frightful complexities of any language 
situation, however much we may think to focus or simplify or adapt 
a given bit of language to our particular abilities and desires, or to 
the abilities, desires, and needs of our students or other clientele. 
lAnn E. Berthoff, "From Problem-Solving to a Theory of I magination," p. 
641n. 
Richards believes that in one particular complication of language in 
action, the adequate translating from one language to another not 
historically or culturally related, from Chinese to English, for example, 
"We have ... what may very probably be the most complex type of 
event yet produced in the evolution of the cosmos."2 And this par-
ticular assertion can be taken as merely giving emphasis to the suffi-
ciently complex process of comprehending a statement in one's own 
language. As Richards himself goes on to say: 
"Translation theory has a peculiar duty 
toward man's self-completion. [It] has not only to work 
for better mutual comprehension between users of diverse tongues ; 
more central still in its purposing is a more complete viewing of 
itself and of the Comprehending which it should serve."3 
Now this lecture finally will attempt to focus so much on a 
particular cluster of language considerations, and will insist so definite-
lyon their importance, that it may be well first to acknowledge at 
least a few of the many other also important aspects of life and of 
language that it will not deal with. 
I believe, for example, that significant physical and mental ex-
periences do take place apart from language. To insist on the import-
ance of language is not to deny the importance of other experiences. 
I also recognize that significant language situations occur that 
have little or no concern with "taking" thought, little concern with 
what might be called thought in an overt sense-"phatic com-
munion," it has been called: many of our routine social signals and 
responses, some rituals, and the like. 4 
I believe, as a final example of what I shall not talk about, 
that language can be profitably studied as a separable thing in itself, 
2Speculative Instruments, p. 22. 
3Ibid. , p. 38. 
4C. K. Ogden and Richards : "In 'good morning' and 'good-bye' the refer-
ential function lapses, i.e., these verbal signs are not symbols, it is enough if they 
are suitable. Exclamations and oaths similarly are not symbols; they have only 
to satisfy the condition of appropriateness. . . ." The Meaning of M eaning, 
p. 234. See also S. I. Hayakawa's Language in Thought and Action, especially 
chapter 6, "The Language of Social Cohension." 
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its patterns identified, its workings analyzed, its operations described. 
We ask our English majors to do a fair bit of such study. 
What I will attempt finally to deal with in what follows, however, 
is our developed language as something not separable from us, 
something that is essentially of us, us as identifiably human beings. 
Nearly all of the most significant thought, nearly all of our develop-
ment that is most distinctly and distinctively human, takes place 
in, by, with, through, language. It is not merely that the development 
could not take place without language- for that again seems to 
identify language as something separable. It is that a person's de-
velopment in language is his development, not separable, finally, from 
him. Language, as Richards puts it, is not "a code . .. it is an organ-
the supreme organ of the mind's self-ordering growth . ... language 
is an instrument for controlling our becoming."5 
As is true of other organs, when language is functioning well , 
we pay little or no attention to it or its complexities. Part of the 
difficulty, in fact, of doing justice to the problems of expression and 
interpretation that Richards asks us to deal with is that routine 
language experience occurs so effortlessly, so unconcernedly, so 
second-natured naturally, that when we do run into difficulties we 
do not always recognize them as difficulties of our developing language. 
Or, what can be even worse, we think of the language difficulties 
as if they were separable, as if the thought would be available if only 
we could get at it without having to use language, "as though com-
posing were a sort of catching a nonverbal butterfly in a verbal 
butterfly net, as though comprehending were a releasing of the said 
butterfly from the net .... "6 
May I therefore ask you to do some very difficult work as you 
participate with me in this lecture, work comparable to making 
your heart skip a beat by thinking about its doing so, work com-
parable to improving your basal metabolism by paying some atten-
tion to it.7 
5Speculative Instruments, p. 9. 
6Richards, So Much Nearer, p. 175, and see pp. 28-29, below. 
7See Richards, Interpretation in T eaching, p. 288. 
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First, let us examine Richards' theoretical analysis of what 
goes on in language situations. 8 
He begins with what help he can get from the communications 
engineer, and observes that for communication to occur, there must 
be a source which selects, encodes, and transmits, and a destination 
which receives, decodes, and develops. 0 
The fact that the process can be talked of in such terms is no 
doubt the reason for so many attempts to deal with language as if it 
were only a code. Unique complexities develop, however, because 
these processes are not just matters of retrieving one meaning-
equivalent for each word, or one pattern of meaning for each pattern 
of wording. Every creating and every interpreting of a language 
utterance is influenced or determined by "any number of partially 
similar situations in which partially similar utterances have occurred," 
and 
the comprehending is a function of the comparison fields from 
which it derives. Let the units of which these comparison fields 
consist be utterances-within-situations-the utterance and its 
situation being partners in the network of transactions with other 
utterances in other situations which lends significance to the 
utterance. Partially similar utterances made within very different 
situations are likely to require different comprehendings. 10 
Richards suggests that the total processes of dealing with these 
innumerable influences plus carrying out the immediate intentions 
of the source or the destination involve at least seven ((sorts of work" 
all operating more or less continuously and all mutually influencing 
each other as they simultaneously occur. He offers the following 
scheme of what is likely to be going on in any uttering or compre-
hending beyond the simplest. 
SAgain, in the particular discussion I cite most, he is talking specifically 
about translation theory, but what he says clearly fits situations in which 
people are using the same language, and he uses much the same ideas in 
talking about these situations. 
nspeculative Instruments, p. 22 . See also So Much Nearer, pp. 156ff., 
185ff. 
10Richards, Speculative Instrum ents, p. 23. 
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1. Indicates: points to, selects. . . . 
2. Characterizes: says something about, sorts. 
3. Realizes: comes alive to, wakes up to, presents. 
4. Values: cares about .... 
5. Influences: would change or keep as it is. . 
6. Controls: manages, directs, runs, administers itself. 
7. Purposes: seeks, pursues, tries, endeavors to he or to 
do ... ." 
These, mark you again, are all operating more or less continu-
ously, and are all mutually influencing each other as they simultane-
ously occur. Clearly if there is complexity of the degree suggested 
by such a scheme, we are not dealing with any direct, one-to-one 
encoding-decoding process. 
These "sorts of work" are clear-cut enough, will all bear think-
ing about, and are not offered by Richards as necessarily designating 
llAdaptcd from S/Jecuiative Instruments, p. 26. 
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all that goes on, or as all going on inevitably, in every language 
situation."~ But that at least these complexities are likely to develop 
I commend for your consideration. 
For this lecture, however, having called them to your attention, 
I would like to focus not on the sorts of work being done but on 
some aspects of the processes themselves, the processes of creating 
and interpreting the utterances that do these sorts of work. And the 
first aspect I would ask you to deal with is the matter of inter-
preting the "partially similar utterances" in "partially similar situa-
tions," the comprehending of which is "a function of the comparison 
fields from which it derives." Let us start with what I hope will 
seem clear-cut examples, to see if we can catch some language in 
action, to watch how it behaves, rather than either analyzing it part 
hy part, as if it were a model or a dead specimen, or simply letting 
it do its work, as we are accustomed to doing, and as we should do 
much of the time, in routine situations, without trying to see how it 
does it. 
Let us start by looking at one or two samples of a type often 
used in Freshman English classes, or in beginning linguistics classes. 
What I am asking you to do is to see if you can tell what goes on. 
It is not that there is any difficulty of interpretation here. The inter-
esting question is, why do we find no difficulty in interpretation? 
Language functions with human beings. I am asking you to ask 
yourselves, what happens within or to you as you comprehend? 
First, then, examples of a couple of ordinary words requiring 
completely different comprehendings because they are utterances 
within different situations. 
The report gave full statistics and discussed the implications of the 
dead game count in Utah for 1972. 
Let me tell you the inspiring story of an injured but dead game 
athlete. 
l ~"There is swearing," he notes, "and there is mathematics." He also 
explains why he did not add "venting"-releasing emotions or tensions in some 
sense- after it was suggested to him, though it clearly is important in most 
language situations, perhaps in a sense in all, or nearly all. 
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Now, you have no difficulty comprehending the sense of "dead 
game" in either sentence. You do not have to think about why you 
do not have to think about it. Yet how is it that you can immediately 
and confidently give completely different interpretations to the same 
two words? Or are they the same words?: and if not, how are their 
differences established? Certainly not by sound or by appearance 
on the printed page or lighted screen. 
Let us look at a little different kind of sample, wherein the 
change of one word requires completely different comprehension of 
otherwise identical structures. Remember that "Partially similar 
utterances made within very different situations are likely to require 
different comprehendings." 
I'm calling you a doctor. 
I'm calling you a liar. 1 3 
In almost any actual communication situation there would be 
no misunderstanding of either statement. But the question I am asking 
you to deal with is, how do you bring yourself immediately to the one 
comprehension or the other, without the question of there heing a 
need for a choice even crossing your mind?-unless it is forced 
to cross your mind, as I am doing. In any given situation the mean-
ings which you prohably gave to the two samples could be reversed. 
If the situation were such that the person using the first statement 
were accusing you of being a doctor, or categorizing you as one, 
you would likely understand that that was his meaning. If the person 
using the second one meant that you were in need of the services of 
a liar, and that he was going to telephone for one, or send for one 
(I am trying also to demonstrate various possible meanings that 
"call" might have in either of the two main patterns of understand-
ing) , you would understand his meaning. 
The comprehension of such samples is easy: it is, as noted, 
the explaining of how we do it that is hard. When the com pre-
13Will Pitkin asks his students in beginning linguistics to give the possible 
meanings of "His mother left him a gibbering idiot." Most people who work 
with language are convinced that people, including students, should look for 
language jokes, should have a lot of fun with language, along with whatever 
else they do with it. 
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hension itself offers difficulties, getting at them can be an extremely 
tortuous process. Ever since about our ninth year we have functioned 
so easily and completely within our routine language situations that 
we have no idea of the complexities we have mastered. Precisely 
because we do function so easily most of the time, we often do not 
know where to begin our attack on a non-routine language problem. 
Comprehending is pulling it all together. We routinely do so at once 
(or think we do ) ; when we can't do so all at once with a particular 
utterance, written or spoken, we are at a loss about any part of it 
until we have considered each part and the whole situation, for every 
part influences every other part, and only after we have considered 
all parts, from words to any larger language units, not to mention still 
larger contexts, as I hope to show, can we finally pull it all together. 
Suppose there is a single word that we do not understand. Very 
often we pause on a word- and should pause more often, never 
assuming that we know what a word means in any given occurrence. 
When we do have to pause, we often turn to a dictionary for help. 
Certainly that is one valid approach to a word, to capture it in a 
dictionary, and examine it a'l it lies there tranquilized, clearly alive 
and hreathing, hut inactive enough to let us turn it over at our leisure. 
The dictionary maker, as hest he can, first tries to say what a 
word means all hy itself : 
, fire La: the phenomenon of combustion as manifested 
in light, flame, and heat and in heating, destroying and altering 
effects 
That seems clear-cut and satisfactory enough. But a good dictionary 
maker cannot stop there. Into a collegiate-sized dictionary he may 
put as many as forty or fifty such definitions of various possible mean-
ings of tire. Then, if he is conscientious and has space enough, he 
gives some examples of it in action, lets the tranquilizer wear off a 
little. W ebster's Third Unabrid!!,ed ha<; three-fourths of a column 
dealing with the word. The Oxford En!!,lish Dictionary examines it 
through thirteen and a half columns. 
The editors of the best dictionaries, in other words, believe that 
they must give "utterances-within-situations" if the dictionary user is 
to get a good heginning insight into words that he doesn't know or 
8 
feels he doesn't know well enough. But even thirteen and a half 
columns cannot give much experience compared to the total experi-
ences we all have with words that we use or meet at all regularly. And 
all of these experiences, as Richards has indicated, affect every dif-
ferent occurrence of the word that we experience, and each new 
experience then affects each subsequent one: thus all language stays 
alive, changing, developing, as we use it. 
Let us look at that word "fire" a little more. It says something 
all by itself, just as a word. It does not say what "water," just as a 
word, says. We would almost never think of looking it up in a 
dictionary - we have already had much, much more experience with 
it than any dictionary could give us. 14 
fire 
Now let us release it from its tranquilized state into some simple 
language contexts and see if we can then sneak up on it and catch 
it in action: 
Just after he had become convinced that he 
would never be warm again, he had found not 
only roof and walls, but a hearth containing a 
most welcome fire. 
It's on fire! Get the hose! I'll call the neighbors. 
The officer raised his sword. The rifles were 
leveled. The expected word came with only a 
slight nervous pause: "Uh, fire!" The figure at 
the wall jerked and slumped. It was over. 
His attempted joking with the jury 
missed fire , to the great detriment of his client. 
His boss fire Joe? He wouldn't dare. 
14There are of course certain utterances of " fire" that most of us would not 
be able to interpret at once because we would not have experienced any partially 
similar utterances in partially similar situations and would have to go to a dic-
tionary to learn that fire can mean " to ring all the bells in a chime at once." 
Or, try this for comprehension : "There is something to be done with the ball 
when the wicket has fire in it ." 
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Obviously we could go on indefinitely, if not forever. The word 
as repeated is spelled the same, would be pronounced the same (or 
if there were any differences it would not be these that chiefly af-
fected the meaning): in some sense, it clearly is the same word. 1 5 
In another sense, they are not the same words; they communicate 
different ideas as they are affected by (and as they in turn affect) 
the contexts put around them. "Fire" even as meaning ordinary 
combustion, we see, means something different depending on whether 
the context shows that combustion to be a comfort or a threat. Thus 
we can argue that every use of the word is a unique use: each word 
used means something that never has been meant before, and never 
will be meant again. Yet that unique meaning can come into being 
only because of a word's meanings developed by previous use of it 
in previous situations. And you think you are dealing with a code, 
do you? 
Will you keep in mind how you interpreted immediately and 
with very different meanings "dead game," " I'm calling you a," and 
"fire," as we proceed. What was going on around here as it happened? 
For the tendency to think that we know, or can find out definitely 
from a dictionary, what a word means in a given context, the assump-
tion that a word keeps the same meaning from context to context, is, 
as Richards demonstrates, one of the most persistent causes of mis-
interpretation. The reader must be ever alert to what this word 
means in this context if he is to compose or to interpret well, whether 
to be benefitted by beneficial expression or not harmed by faulty. 
Now in some scientific and technical contexts, words can be 
assigned comparatively definite, rather fixed meanings. When-
ever we are dealing with things and actions that can be pointed to, 
and when we for some reason really want to be as precise as possible, 
we can regiment language to our purposes. There is little problem 
interpreting such material: 
15For the lecture the same transparency that put the shadow on the screen 
which spelled out " fire" was left on continuously, and the contexts were put on 
by overlays, thus allowing nominalists to consider whether or not it was the 
same word. 
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Methods 
Dried brine shrimp cysts (gastrulae) were obtained and stored 
at - 20°C. Development was initiated by hydration of the cysts 
in Instant Ocean Sea Salts at 25°C. Approximately 24 hours were 
needed for hatching at this temperature. The tolerance of early 
nauplii to NaCI in the medium was measured as survival per-
centages in different salinities after 32 hours of incubation (Fig. 
lA ) . Sodium and potassium ion levels were assayed by flame 
photometry using a Beckman Model B Spectrophotometer. The 
nauplii were prepared by rinsing with distilled water and drying 
at 105°C for 24 hours. The dried nauplii were weighed and 
dissolved in a l: l: 1 mixture of HN03 , H 20 2, and H 20 at 95°C 
for 40 min. Results are expressed as ,uEq of cations per mg of 
naupliar dry weight.16 
That is, there is little problem for those who recognize the words and 
other symbols; and for those who have participated in similar actions 
and who have made and read similar utterances, there is hardly 
ever any problem of misintepretation with such a statement com-
petently composed. 
But such things and actions, important as they can be to our 
human purposes and achievements, are ultimately not nearly so import-
ant as other activities are. In fact such things and actions cannot 
become important until we relate them, determine their significance, 
in fact make them be important to us. And "determine their signi-
ficance" is not an action we can point to; relationship, significance, 
importance, are not things we can point to. Every time we see such 
words, try to think of such ideas as these, we need to become very 
alert to the difficulties of making our utterances and our interpreta-
tions. 
Let us, then, look at a different level of utterance: 
So why was Smith's discovery not plimmed in its day? Because 
it was "proloshar." But is this really an explanation or is it 
merely empty tautology? In other words, is there a way of providing 
i 6F . P . Conte, et aI., "Neck Organ of ATtemia salina Nauplii: a Larval 
Salt Gland," p. 240. 
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a criterion of the prolosharity of a discovery other than its failure 
to make an impact? Yes, there is such a criterion. A discovery is 
proloshar if its implications cannot be connected by a series of 
simple logical steps to evantified knowledge. 
Do you know what the utterance is talking about, can you In-
terpret it? No, you cannot. You could make an accurate syntactical 
analysis, diagram the sentences, identify the parts of speech. But 
you cannot yet know precisely what even the words that you do 
recognize mean in this passage, because you do not know what some 
other words mean. Yet this is very often our situation when we are 
trying to develop ourselves, to increase our mental comprehension. 
And such a situation is, or should be, the situation a student finds 
himself in most of the time. If he is not, he is simply rehashing or 
reviewing, not opening up his mind. 
Now it would be unfamiliar material indeed that contained so 
high a proportion of unrecognized words. But actually, a more im-
portant problem of interpretation is that we too often assume we 
know what a word means just because we recognize it. You all knew 
what "fire" meant when I first asked you to take note of the word-
and you proceeded promptly to assign it a number of very different 
meanings in different contexts. But what about more subtle differences 
which are not always distinguished because the context does not 
insist that we do so? There are often key words to the meaning of a 
passage that are really, as Richards puts it, lock words that bar us 
from the meaning until we adequately open up their possibilities. All 
of you recognize, having seen and used them many, many times, 
the words "canonical," "premature," and "appreciate." You have 
experienced them more often than "tautology."l7 
What I am requiring you to do at the moment is to treat the 
three words as lock-or-key words by withholding them from you 
momentarily. Let us, then, start pulling the passage together by 
171 am not sure that I understand what "empty tautology" means in the 
passage as accurately quoted below. Some valid definitions can be said to be 
tautological, and if anyone is explaining what he means in "other words" 
that really help us to understand, then the restatement is not empty. I do not see 
that "premature" is a tautological explanation for "lack of appreciation ." But 
am 1 appreciating the question Stent thought needed to be asked? 
12 
translating "evantified" into "canonical" : the passage is talking about 
canonical knowledge. And "plimmed" means "appreciated." So 
Smith's discovery was not appreciated in its day hecause it could not 
he easily and clearly connected to canonical knowledge. Now do we 
know what is being talked about? Well, we still need to know that 
"proloshar" means "premature." Smith's discovery was not appre-
ciated because it was premature. And incidentally, it was not really 
a person named Smith, which is just a convenient way of showing 
it was a person- who can keep all those names straight, anyway. 
Let us look at the original utterance, accurately quoted: 
So why was Avery's discovery not appreciated in its day ? 
Because it was "premature." But is this really an explanation or is 
it merely empty tautology? In other words, is there a way of pro-
viding a criterion of the prematurity of a discovery other than its 
failure to make an impact? Yes, there is such a criterion: A dis-
covery is premature if its implications cannot be connected by a 
series of simple logical steps to canonical, or generally accepted . 
knowledge.1s 
Now surely we can interpret the passage. Well, we can if we 
know that the Avery whom Gunther H. Stent is talking ahout is 
Oswald Avery, which means then that the discovery is the "identi-
fication of DNA as the active principle in hacterial transformation 
and hence as genetic material."1O 
And we do have to know, or learn in some way about such larger 
contexts as this last to interpret such a passage adequately- which 
means that all who really have followed the work of such men as 
Avery are comprehending this passage much more fully than the 
rest of us are, right this minute, even though we comprehend it, 
presumably, about as well as those can who have no expertise in bio-
chemistry. 
But now wait a minute. What is "canonical" doing in a passage 
talking of scientific knowledge? Well, depending on our previous 
experiences of "utterances-with in-situations" we might not pay any 
18Gunther S. Stent, "Prematurity and Uniqueness in Scientific Discovery," 
p. 84. 
l°/bid. 
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attention to the word, perCeIVing (or thinking that we perceive) 
immediately what the writer means; or it might give us pause-and 
apparently he thought it might give some readers pause, because he 
throws in "generally accepted" to help point toward what he means 
hy it. 
But actually it is to some extent the word "appreciate" and to an 
even greater extent the word "premature" that the reader must be 
most careful not to misinterpret, and Stent alerts us to be particularly 
careful of the latter by putting it in quotes. If we take care to under-
stand what he means by it, we are able to interpret the passage (and 
his whole article, which has as one major concern this question of 
prematurity in scientific discovery). But if we start off thinking 
that of course we know what "appreciate" and "premature" mean, 
and assign to each of them immediately some one of their many 
possible meanings (remember "fire"), then we are liable to a misin-
terpretation. Avery's work not appreciated? Nonsense. Everyone noted 
it at the time and agreed that it was important. A genuine scientific 
discovery premature? Nonsense. It was brilliant, it has been verified, 
it had to come at that time or (after still other discoveries) Watson 
and Crick probably wouldn't have been inspired to search out the 
structure of DNA, which led to their discovery of the double helix; 
Therefore, Avery'S work ohviously was not only not premature, it 
came barely soon enough. 
Such reactions are all too common as we read. 20 Those who 
take care to understand what Stent is talking about may like or dis-
like, agree or disagree with his idea that Avery's discovery 
was premature. But one has to interpret Stent's meaning to have any 
of these responses to Stent's meaning, and the ahove "nonsense" re-
sponses are not dealing with what "appreciate" and ~'premature" 
mean in Stent's passage. 
As a significant part of Richards' practical investigations into 
problems of interpretation, -he has had many, many students write 
interpretations of written material for him over the years and has 
2°lt is clear from the helps he offers the reader that Stent realized very 
well the danger of his point being misunderstood. Unfortunately, not all writers 
take pains to ward against misinterpretation, and readers still misinterpret no 
matter how careful a writer may be. 
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published some of the results.21 To work through some of these exer-
cises as he sets them forth is a sobering experience for anyone in 
terms of his own interpretative abilities, and an overwhelming warning 
system for teachers-and I do not mean just teachers of language 
and literature. We all expect students to be able to interpret what we 
have them read and what they hear from us, and we assume that 
they do. But whenever we possibly can, we need to have them com-
pose utterances-within-situations, and we need to interpret these 
utterances carefully, so that we and they have some chance of seeing 
whether they have in fact interpreted what we asked them to. 
For particular kinds of information, and under pressures of some 
necessarily large class sizes, we may have to do a lot of routine check-
ing by asking students to write numbers or fill in blanks in response 
to such items as the following: 
The experiments by Conte and others measured the tolerance 
of brine shrimps to (1 ) AgNO~ (2 ) NaCI (3) PO. (4) KCl 
(5 ) None of the foregoing. 
Yet we must be aware that such checking can give no assurance that 
the student who knows the right answer because of attentive reading 
(let alone the one who guesses it), understands the distinction he is 
being asked to make. The only reasonable assurance we have is that he 
will come to understand it if he continues dealing with such situations, 
and makes and receives utterances about them. 
With a statement such as Stent's there is no way to get at whether 
the reader has come to a valid interpretation or any guarantee that he 
will develop his ability to interpret, if he simply checks off word 
repetitions, identification of meaning by synonyms, or the like. A 
reader may know very well that Stent called Avery's discovery pre-
mature, and may never come to doubt that he therefore understands 
Stent's meaning (since he does "of course know" what "premature" 
means) without in fact ever understanding it at all. That such mis-
understandings do occur continually among intelligent and well-
educated people, Richards has documented, as noted.22 Once we 
21Especially in Practical Criticism and Interpretation in T eaching. 
22Edward R . Ducharme, in "The Evasion of the Text," and, according 
to Richards (So Much Nearer, pp. 254-255 ), F. L. Lucas, in an art icle in 
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move beyond things and actions that we can point to, move to signifi-
cances, relationships, meanings, no matter what the field of knowledge 
is, understanding can come only in language, "the supreme organ of 
the mind's self-ordering growth." 
So far, what I have tried to illustrate is that we can interpret 
language only as we gra<;p an entire utterance, and grasp it entirely, 
as is indicated etymologically in "comprehend." I hope that I have 
provided convincing illustrations of how the immediate language con-
text brings us to meaning, and we could spend much more time on 
this: illustrate in detail how sound, syntax, the range of meanings 
that each word has for us due to its previous uses (meanings denota-
tive, connotative, relational, etymological . . . ) all must come together 
if we are to interpret a text. But we must not forget that all utterances 
are made within larger human situations, and that previous, present 
and future human situations provide in all language situations in-
numerable influences that also affect the meaning and comprehension. 
It is Richards' work with contexe 3 that perhaps more than 
anything else sets him apart from most others who work in linguistics 
and semantics. He keeps insisting on both the necessity and the diffi-
culty of bearing in mind, in any working with comprehending lan-
guage, whether composing or interpreting, all the influences in the 
process, anything from the immediately surrounding words (as I have 
tried to illustrate to this point), to the complete history of the utterer, 
of the comprehender, and of the language being used. And although 
completeness in any sense in regard to these latter is just plain impossi-
Cam bridge University Studies, offer further evidence of the kind that Richards 
gives. 
23Richards uses "context" in The M eaning of M eaning, but says elsewhere 
(S peculative Instruments, p. 23n. ) that it apparently misled some readers. It 
seems to me the best word still. In Interpretation in T eaching he suggests 
"context" to mean "whatever meaning . . [a word] has through belonging 
to a recurrent group of events. ." and "setting" to mean "the words which 
surround it in the utterance, and the other contemporaneous signs which govern 
its interpretation." (p. viii ; see also S o Much Nearer, pp. 144-145.) In any 
event, he wishes to have us consider all of the influences at work in the whole 
communication situation. In Speculative Instruments he tries nexus, and says 
there that comprehending "is an instance of a nexus established through past 
occurrences of partially .similar utterances in partially similar situations-utter-
ances and situations partially co-varying." (pp. 23-24.) 
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ble, we must always go as far as we can, or as far as the situation 
justifies, for the extent to which this total context can be brought to 
bear on the communication situation determines how much compre-
hension can be achieved. 
Let me see now if I can illustrate in brief something of how 
context in this larger sense can help determine interpretation of a text. 
A Modest Proposal by Jonathan Swift is a straightforward essay 
whose words and structure offer so little difficulty to an experienced 
reader that he is likely to have no appreciation for the complexities 
he has mastered as he moved to his understanding of it. The interest-
ing question is, how does its actual and plain meaning emerge as being 
almost entirely the exact opposite of what the words, as such, say? 
There is no doubt in any reader's mind that the meaning of the words, 
the immediate language utterance, can be understood only in a wider 
human context. Even younger students, who are sometimes disturbed 
when they first read this essay, know that further understanding is 
called for. Even though the tone seems so neutral, the atmosphere so 
bland, the development so reasonable, they never fail to puzzle over 
what the author can possibly be up to, because he cannot be serious 
about what he says-they know that. Yet only one who has grown 
up in a society whose members never eat people-or do so only under 
great stress-and who knows that Swift was not mad (at the time), 
and that although he was a misanthrope he sought genuinely for the 
welfare of his fellow man, can finally with confidence comprehend 
that Swift was being savagely and bitterly ironic in proposing that the 
poverty problems of Ireland be solved by the well-to-do paying poor 
mothers for yearling children, who are to be slaughtered and eaten. 
Only because people in our society cannot accept this proposal at the 
literal word meaning, is everyone driven to a comprehending at some 
other level, and the essay continues to give readers profound experi-
ences with irony. 
We may note by contrast the career of Daniel Defoe's The 
Shortest Way With The Dissenters, written not many years before 
Swift's proposal. Defoe's text advocated extreme measures against 
all who would not worship in the Church of England, who wished to 
establish their own independent chapels and congregations. Again, 
what he really meant could only be determined by total context, and 
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it took some time for this to prevail. Defoe assumed that his proposals 
were so outrageous that they would cause people to think carefully 
about what would really be proper treatment for dissenters. Actually, 
a number of the extreme churchmen thought the suggestions were ex-
cellent, and a number of dissenters saw them as serious threats. 
Unfortunately for Defoe, in the minds of a number of people it was 
not impossible to pass and enforce a law in England at that time "that 
whoever was found at a conventicle should be banished the nation, 
and the preacher be hanged." When the more sensible leaders who 
saw that it really was impossible pointed out this fact, the high Tories 
were highly incensed that the low fellow had so taken them in, and 
the government arrested him, fined him heavily, and sent him to the 
pillory. Fortunately for Defoe, the more balanced among the dissenters 
also by this time saw that what he had proposed was impossible, that 
therefore he really was on their side, and they rallied round to make 
sure that he didn't get stoned2 4 while in the pillory. Thus at the 
end of the affair, his roles had been reversed: he was a villain with the 
Tories and a hero with the common people. But again, from only the 
language itself, it had proved impossible to tell what was meant: only 
the total context could do it. 
Now, perhaps if we take seriously the term "total context," we 
have by definition included everything of the language situation. But 
in this total context of the language situation there is yet one more 
specific aspect that I would like you to look at. 
There is little difficulty these days in getting acknowledgment 
that words are symbols: the word is not the thing or the action it 
points to. Your eyes were neither dazzled nor smoke-filled, your skin 
neither warmed nor burned by having the word "fire" brought into 
your presence. But to say that a word is a symbol hardly gets us 
started. In any given language utterance we must distinguish- I 
hope you now agree-whether a given word (say "fire") means, 
stands for, symbolizes, something as clear cut and identifiable, as 
point-to-able, as physical coals in a stove or the process of, the changes 
that are taking place in, a combustion; or whether there is an extension 
24How does any reader know that what I mean here is not "experience the 
effects of smoking marijuana or of drinking alcohol"? 
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of meaning, whereby, say, the result formerly achieved by the placing 
of a process of combustion against some highly combustible material 
is now accomplished by pulling a trigger; or whether there is even 
simply a designating of the word itself: a four-letter noun, or verb, or 
adjective, or whether ... and so on. 
As we come seriously to wrestle with language, we at times yearn 
for a system that would give us clear-cut, definite meanings for words, 
so that we could always say what we mean, and mean what we say. 
Let "fire" mean the coals, or at most the coals and the process. In 
particular, some say, let us not get fancy and talk of our hearts being 
on fire or of lighting a fire under a committee slow to turn in a report. 
The point again is that if we simplify we can develop a great deal 
of precision in actions, observations, language. Consider the technical 
report that water boils at 100°C. It does, does it? Not very often; it 
doesn't. Life as we live it, experience as we have it, significance as we 
achieve it, is not simple. It is well to know that water boils at 100°C, 
but it is also well to remember that "as a matter of fact" it seldom 
really does so. Without rigorous exclusion of non-water materials 
nearly always associated with water as we find it- is laboratory 
water more real than that in a mountain stream ?-without rigorous 
control of atmospheric pressure, we cannot make water boil at precisely 
"its" boiling point. Probably everyone who grew up in the mountains 
has learned the difficulties of hard-boiling an egg at 10,000 feet. 
And to achieve meaning, significance, a sense of relationship 
in our most important, never simplified, always "impure" (in the sense 
that all non-laboratory water is impure), cluttered-up experiencing, 
we have to have expressions that embrace, seize together, "compre-
hend" a whole cluster of meanings "all at once" and "all together." 
And the most important way that language accomplishes this is 
metaphor. 
Richards of course is not alone in noting metaphor in language 
as both elemental and pervasive, operating in all language situations 
except those from which it is deliberately and rigorously excluded 
for particular purposes, the distilled laboratory language of the tech-
nical report, for example-and there are always dead and very often 
living metaphors even there. 
We tend to think of poets and people like that using figurative 
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language, but no doubt most of you here have had called to your 
attention the fact that we all use it continually. Metaphor is so much 
a part of language, so much a part of thinking, that it becomes a real 
question to find out-if we can even begin to--how much our 
figurative way of expressing something determines how and what 
we think as well as feel about it. All students of language feel a 
close affinity with the person who said, "How do I know what I think 
about the matter until I've heard what I have to say about it?" The 
fact is that we do not know what we think-we do not know what we 
feel-on most matters until we have worked through our expressions 
about them, and those expressions seem just naturally to keep breaking 
away from, or out of the restraints of, literalism, to have to do so, to 
keep saying what we wish to say.25 
Suppose that we are thinking about something. What metaphor 
do we decide to use for the kind of thinking we are doing? Are we 
pondering? Are we speculating? Are we ruminating? For most of 
us most of the time these words are dead metaphors, but they still 
carry over in connotation some sense of the original figure: and inter-
estingly, we have again come up with the same figures in our modem 
words. We ponder s0!l1ething, or we weigh the matter in our mind. 
We speculate about something, or we take a look at it, not meaning 
25For a sampling of Richards' dealing with metaphor, see Int erpretation 
in T eaching, chapter 2. He of course deals with it continually in his discussions 
of interpretation. 
Susanne K. Langer postulates that "The spontaneous similes of language 
are our first record of similarities perceived," that metaphor is therefore the law 
of the life of language, "the force that makes it essentially relational," and 
that only after language has developed its great practical applications can human 
beings actually come to "believe that it was invented as a utility, and was 
later embellished with metaphors for the sake of a cultural product called 
poetry." Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 141-142. 
One can be continually brought up short by terms obviously technical that 
on the face of them suggest fascinating metaphorical origins. I can see that I 
have no business reading any social or literary extension into the word as Stent 
uses it when he talks about the studies that led to the realization that "DNA 
might not be a monotonous polymer after all;" but "the question of the reality 
of the negative image," and "a pointwise-degenerate system of the form," and 
an "electron scavenger," and numerical values that are "sensitive to the choice" 
(all samples from recent technical journals ) make an outsider think that meta-
phor is still very much at work in the creation of technical terms. 
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with our literal eyes. We ruminate, or we chew on a problem for 
awhile. Why do we go along a line of thought, but have an area of 
study? Why not develop a volume or room of study, not just an area 
or field? (Are these more open, with the third dimension taken for 
granted?) When we say that one idea depends on another, the meta-
phor is dead, but we say in the words of our own language that a 
series of ideas, all hang together, or that an outcome hangs on whether 
something else happens. 
Now the word "fire," we agreed earlier, does not mean what 
the word "water" does. 26 And the word "lips" does not mean what 
tHe word "rosebud" means, yet we have all experienced the use of the 
word "rosebud" to mean someone's lips. 
A. E. Housman ends one of his poems thus: 
About the woodlands I will go 
To see the cherry hung with snow. 
The first of those two lines seems to be completely literal - at 
least there would seem to be no reason to doubt that Housman, 
or his implied speaker, the 20-year-old lad, did intend to go about the 
woodlands whenever the general situation of the poem did recur. 
But in the second line "cherry" means "whatever cherry trees are 
there," or something of the sort, and "snow" means cherry blossoms, 
while still carrying some of the meanings of snow: its beauty, perhaps 
its coldness, certainly the fact that it comes seasonally and does not last. 
And "hung" is both literal and suggestive: cherry blossoms and snow 
do hang from branches, though they also stay on top of them: and 
of course "to hang" also means "to decorate." 
What all users of language do with shiftings, overtones, and 
ambiguities such as these is to blend a whole complexity of experiences 
-seeing, feeling, and whatever else we call experience-into a 
response that we would not have except for this human genius within 
all of us that lets us both blend experiences and respond to words 
all at once in many ways, in a flash, or in something less than a flash. 
26Carlton Culmsee likes to see how prospective teachers react to a bit of 
advice: If you detect a spark of genius in a student, he tells them, by all 
means water it. 
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Therefore, a., a final specific set of exercises, in my attempt to 
show you something of what I think I. A. Richards means by identify-
ing language as "the supreme organ of the mind's self-ordering 
growth," consider with me the sense that I suspect all of us here have, 
that we as individuals are inevitably at the center of our psychological 
and physiological universe. The universe, for each of us, starts with us 
and stretches out forever in all directions away from our sensory and 
mental focus, and we therefore find ourselves responding to expres-
sions that communicate and enlarge this sense of being at the center 
of all that we know. 
Now, I do not say that we are inevitably, or from every viewpoint, 
at the center of this universe. We may even accept the findings that 
our solar system is toward an edge of our galaxy, for example. But 
our culture and the individuals in it generally see man as at the center: 
some ohjects, we say (do not we have to do so?) are so many light 
years away, and are receding; or, angels and heaven are above us, 
heasts and insects and hell below us; or, the complete cosmos is 
grander, more largely organized than we, the amoeba and mineral 
existence are less developed, less fully organized. Some such organizing 
overviews of all experience seem essential to us; apparently we cannot 
function as humans (hecome human?) without some such. Our 
particular view of ourselves as heing in the middle, however, should 
not he considered as even psychologically inevitable. It may be that 
the sense of having "some position" in the scheme of things (some 
sense of there being a scheme of things) is inevitable for the mind 
that can be called human. But it would appear that at least an indi-
vidual here and there has, for example, viewed himself as the lowest 
entity on the universal totem pole, and another has seen himself as 
the apex of all that is. 
To come up with the idea that man "has a position," let alone 
the idea that he is somewhere in the middle, would be impossible, 
of course, without language. To deal with such an idea adequately 
makes the greatest demands pos..,ible on both our expressive and in-
terpretive powers. Simply to mention many of the possibilities shows 
off a great deal of language in action. Is man "the heart of the uni-
verse," or is he "caught in the middle of things"? Is his life an ordeal 
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or an opportunity, or both, or something in between? Whichever 
it is, is it a time interlude in an eternal existence, a preparation for a 
new existence, or a brief consciousness between endlessly back and 
endlessly forward projecting situations of individual non-awareness? 
How much have you heard and read of such possibilities? How 
much more do you hear and read and think and react within a 
context of the unspecifically-thought-of assumption that such is your 
situation? Yet we cannot hegin to deal with such speculations, 
ideas, sensings, without language. 
And language cannot begin to deal with them without metaphor. 
We cannot get single-word, pinned-down technical expressions for 
such encompassing experiences. 
Let me try to give point to this assertion by having you look at 
just three or four excerpt'> from as many attempts to give expression 
to this general idea, of the many, many that we have in our Western 
culture. At the same time, of course, we will be dealing still with 
the total context of these utterances within situations. See if you ran 
watch what is happening, as I asked you to watch what happened with 
"fire. " 
How is man in the middle of things? Consider how the counsellor 
of King Edwin expressed it, when the court were asking themselves 
whether this newly learned of Christianity could give them some 
help on the problem. 
I have observed, my King, that this present life of man on 
earth, in comparison to the time that is unknown, is as though 
you were sitting at a banquet with your chieftains and retainers 
in the wintertime, when the fire is kindled and the hall warmed, 
and it is raining and snowing and storming outside; and a sparrow 
comes in through one door, and departs out another. Behold, 
during the time that he is inside, he is not smitten by the storm of 
winter. But, it is merely the twinkling of an eye and the least 
space that he is out of the winter before he goes back into it. 
Man's life is also thus, and what comes before, or what comes after, 
we do not know. 
The comparison reaches us still, over a millenium of years,27 
27Tautological, or does it add meaning because we now think of a millenium 
as one unit of time, not a thousand years? 
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long after the mead halls have fallen, and glass panes keep sparrows 
from flying toward our fires. Whatever we believe about the times that 
have come before or shall come after, these times on occa~ion look 
cold and alien to us. 
How is man in the middle of things? In the duality that is 
his particular situation and problem. If he were pure spirit or pure 
mind, he would not be troubled with sensuality; if he were only 
sensual, he could not have any concern about being sensual. 
Goethe's Faust, having developed as far as any person might 
reasonably be expected to, still feels unfulfilled and would willingly 
give allegiance to any system that could prove ahle to fulfill him-
and he concludes such a bargain with the devil. Mephistopheles 
offers Faust any experiences he wants, and Faust tries a lot of them, 
but Mephistopheles, being wholly~S a devil, cannot understand the 
half-risen, in-between position of the human being. Faust likes a party, 
hut he can't fulfill himself only by partying. Faust wants sex, but 
finds himself also in love. Faust fulfills himself finally by service to 
others, a path he had to find for himself, since it never would have 
occurred to Mephistopheles to "tempt" him in that direction, 
Mephistopheles having nothing in his nature to incline himself that 
way. 
At one point Mephistopheles, impatient with this human dimen-
sion that he simply cannot understand, sneeringly refers to Faust as a 
"transcendental sensualist."~D Goethe's whole play actually is a 
metaphor of man in that particular situation, and in such a context, 
this phrase is a brilliant language achievement. It says in two words 
what the whole play is saying, yet those two words could not say 
what they do say if their meaning were not established by the total 
play- and by the total context provided by Goethe's and his 
readers' sense of man being in the middle of things. Just as only the 
context could determine which meaning we give to "fire," and what 
Swift meant by advocating that his contemporaries eat the children 
2SMight one say he is purely a devil, or a pure devil? 
~niibersinnlicher sinnlicher Freier. "Transcendental sensualist" is C. F. 
Macintyre's translation, and it seems to me a much more apt term than the 
usual more literal "super-sensual, sensual wooer," or some variation. 
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of the poor, so only by knowing the context in as large a sense as we 
can, are we able to understand what Goethe means by "transcendental 
sensualist. " 
How is man in the middle of things? In Eugene O 'Neill's 
The Hairy Ape, Yank, having lost his innocent sense of "belonging," 
at which time he was not concerned about where his posItIOn was 
in the scheme of things, knowing only that he did "belong," is 
finally driven to say: 
I ain't on oith and I ain't in heaven, get me ? I'm in de middle 
tryin' to separate 'em, takin' all de woist punches from bot' of 'em. 
Maybe dat's what dey call hell, huh? But [to an ape in a zoo] 
you, yuh're at de bottom. You belong! Sure! Yuh're de on'y one 
in de woild dat does, yuh lucky stiff! 
Though the language is deliberately unpoetic, the impact in the total 
play is great. We watch this limited human being-limited if in no 
other way in his opportunities to know anything of other men's 
wrestlings with the problem-lose his unreflective sense of belonging 
and have to try to search out his place in the universe. In that con-
texeo his expression of where he stands, his envy of the beast's un-
complicated position, as he sees it, at the bottom of things, his novel 
positioning of hell as being between earth and heaven, are all very 
meaningful to us. Because we see him working out his expression, 
because we join him in his context, we can interpret what he means, 
and can experience with him. 
Let 'us look at a little longer excerpt- and are you seeing how 
all of our previous ideas help provide context for any partially similar 
utterances? 
30In that context. One reason it is difficult to do justice to any piece of 
literature by talking about it is that such activity by itself has insufficient con-
text. In the classroom, of course, every effort is made to have each student read 
the work before there is any discussion of it (and ideally he will read it 
again-and some works again and again-after any discussion, critique, 
analysis, what you will). One invited to talk about literature in some way, to a 
group whose common literary experiences cannot be identified, is tempted to 
say, Do not come hear me philosophize about literature-stay home and read 
something I have read, go see a play that I have seen, write about something 
meaningful to you and let me read it. Then we can have a meaningful discussion. 
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Plac'd O'n this isthmus O'f a middle state, 
A being darkly wise, and rudely great: 
With tO'O' much knO'wledge fO'r the sceptic side, 
With tO'O' much weakness fO'r the StO'ic's pride, 
He hangs between; in dO'ubt to' act, O'r rest ; 
In dO'ubt to' deem himself a gO'd, O'r beast ; 
In dO'ubt his mind O'r bO'dy to' prefer ; 
BO'rn but to' die, and reas'ning but to' err; 
Alike in ignO'rance, his reasO'n such, 
Whether he thinks tO'O' little, O'r tO'O' much: 
ChaO's O'f thO'ught and passion, all cO'nfus'd; 
Still by himself abus'd, or disabus'd ; 
Created half to' rise, and half to' fall, 
Great 100rd O'f all things, yet a prey to' all; 
SO'le judge O'f truth, in endless errO'r hurl'd: 
The glO'ry, jest, and riddle O'f the wO'rld!31 
There is nO' ward here that anyane in this audience daes nat 
recagnize. With what I have tried to' show abaut context and meta-
phar, dO' yau see what alert attentian nevertheless wauld have to' be 
given by a reader whO' wauld camprehend the passage as fully as 
he can? 
Haw much cantext dO' yau bring to' the basic figure of the isth-
mus, and what is in the masses that yau put an either side af that 
isthmus? Same sart af masses have to' be there far the ward "isthmus" 
to' exist, to' have its meaning- what masses dO' yau put there far 
the ward to' develap its meaning far yau in this text? What dO' 
"darkly" and "wise" data each ather recipracally in such a juxtaposi-
tian? The metaphar that talks af-equates?32-intelligence and wis-
dam in terms af- with- light, and af ignarance and ather mental 
31Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, "Epistle II," II. 3-18. 
32Does a metaphor equate something with something else? I believe we 
might try saying it does if we look at the range of meanings we give to the 
idea of "equal." Note just a very few samples: 
In "Sixteen ounces equal one pound," the word means " is the same as" 
or "add up to" or "is another way of designating. " What does it mean in, 
"The planted acreage was equal to last year's" or "He was equal to the occasion," 
or "All men are created equal"? 
The relationships of ideas in metaphors, those expressions that equate, or 
make equal, or make parallel, or blend in thought or feeling or attitude, or what-
ever it is they do, are indeed fundam ental in all language development and use. 
26 
deficiencies in terms of darkness is one of the pervasive ones of our 
culture}3 Does "rudely" here mean "impolitely," and if not, what 
partially similar utterances and partially similar experiences do you 
have that would let you approach the meaning in this text? What 
different kinds of relationships are generated between these various op-
posing terms? How, for example, is the relationship between thinking 
too much and thinking too little, different from the relationship of 
abused and disabused, or-of between being a lord of all and a prey to 
all? What about the whole pattern of many kinds of opposition all 
affecting each individually stated opposition? What about the final 
triplet: the juxtaposition of "glory" and "jest" makes for a riddle-
but do not all the previous lines as well as these two words give a 
meaning to "riddle" here that it could never have without all of them? 
Not such questions but the responses implied by such questions 
and innumerable others are involved in the comprehending. And with 
a passage of this complexity-and it is of course a straightforward 
passage, comparatively-a great many language and experience re-
sources are needed to re-establish its potential. 34 A high-school or fresh-
man student might be taxed simply to get the plain sense. Any of us 
might open up new insights on any careful re-reading. 
Interpreting anything that provides a developing, an opening 
up of the mind, says Richards, requires attentiveness, "vigilance,"35-
it cannot be done mechanically, routinely, slackly. But vigilance is 
not enough if we do not know how to get started on a problem of 
interpretation. 
The prime obstacle in general education is a feeling of help-
lessness before the unintelligible. Every problem is new to the mind 
which first meets it and it is baffling until he can recognize in it 
something which he has met and dealt with already. The all im-
portant difference between the mind which can clear itself by 
33For a mention of several such important and pervasive ways of looking 
at things and of how critical they might be in translation, see Richards, 
Speculative Instruments, pp. 33-34. 
34Richards offers as a tentative definition of the valid reception of an 
utterance as being a reincarnation to "more or less the same potentialities" as it 
had when it was uttered. So Much Nearer, pp. 166-167. 
35See Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, chapters 22,25,32. 
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thought and the mind which remains bewildered and can proceed 
only by burying the difficulty in a formula-retained, at best, 
by mere rote memory-is in this power to recognize the new 
problem as in part, an old conquest. Language, with its inexhaustible 
duplications (which here are duplicities), ceaselessly presents to 
us the old as though it were new, familiar ideas in novel disguises, 
understood distinctions as fresh opportunities for confusion, already 
assimilated combinations as unforeseeable conjunctions. The 
teacher meets with all this whenever he reads anything which 
stretches his intelligence; the pupil meets with it all the time, and 
if he is being well taught he should be expecting it and enjoying 
the sense of increasing power that his progressive mastery of it can 
afford. For this growth in power is, fundamentally, the vitalizing 
incentive with which education builds. 
The beginner, in studying the most elementary matters, is 
doing nothing which is (or should be ) for him any simpler than 
what we are doing when we try to follow a new and difficult 
author. And we can only help him in a fashion parallel to that 
in which we ourselves would wish to be helped or to help ourselves: 
that is, not by supplying the 'right answer' to the difficulty (with 
some unexamined criterion of 'right answers' ) but by making 
clearer what the difficulty itself was, so that when we meet it again 
we shall not have to 'remember the answer' but shall see what it 
must be from our understanding of the question. A learner at all 
stage learns-for serious purposes- only in so far as he is a 
thinker, and the difficulties of thinking are never new. We over-
come them- in elementary mechanics, and in the Theory of 
Relativity, in learning to read words of one syllable and in reading 
Ulysses, alike-by taking account of them, by seeing what we are 
doing and setting aside other things which we should not be trying 
to do there. We solve them finally by discovering how much more 
simple the task was than we had hitherto supposed.36 
Composing utterances, whether written or spoken-that is, 
utterances of the sort we are dealing with here, not our routine social 
responses- is at least as difficult as interpreting, and is solvable in 
essentially the same way, and only in that way: by thinking through 
each new problem of expression as it occurs. Composing is not learned 
once for all, like riding a bicycle- and we might note that even an 
experienced cyclist rides to a fall now and again. It is not a matter 
3GRichards, Interpretation in T eaching, p. 4. 
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of "finding" words that "fit" a meaning already achieved in some 
way, for «what is said depends on how it is said, and how it is said on 
what is said. W hat we say and how we say it are inseparable- in 
utterances which are entire."31 The most significant kind of meaning 
must find "itself in its words by finding the words for itself."3' In the 
process, "the arrival ofa word and of a meaning may he indistinguish-
ably welcome, or a proffered word because of an accompanying mean-
ing is just as instantaneously dismissed." 39 Sometimes in this struggle 
toward meaning the writer achieves a statement that so clearly shows 
him what he has been groping toward and for, that everything 
written to that point must he extensively reorganized, or even dis-
carded and a "radical restart" undertaken.40 
I have tried in this discussion, by looking at some comparatively 
simple and straightforward examples of language in action, to open 
up our perception of some of its complexities. I can only hope that 
they were simple enough to let you actually catch a glimpse of your 
own language in action within you, and not so simple that you were 
not impressed by what you were able to do: I hope indeed that you 
marvelled and continue to marvel at the tremendous feats you accom-
plish so easily. There is nothing else quite like language in action, in 
the universe as we know it. 
With language which is actually in use among its users, doing 
its continuing work for them, we students and teachers of language, 
of course, are no more and no less involved than anyone else is, 
no closer to our language and no farther away. We too have our 
definite things and actions we can point to, and those of you in other 
fields no more than we can come to your most significant meanings 
apart from, away from, your language. 41 
31Richards, So Mu ch Nearer, p. In. 
3sIbid. He is talking 'here specifically of poetry, but the process is essen-
tially the same for all composition that deals with anything beyond that which 
we can point to. His statement about butterflies and nets, p. 3, above, is another 
way of making the same point. 
39Ibid., p. 137. 
4°Ibid., p. 165. See also Interpretation in Teaching, pp. 275-277, which 
discusses these problems in relation to doctrines of usage which would limit 
expression . 
41Though you may of course depend on other symbol systems also. 
29 
When any experience can be quantified, when any obsezvation 
can be sufficiently simplified or controIIed so that the focus can be kept 
on one thing at a time, however complicated the sequences and total 
patterns, then symbol systems more "pure," more manageable than 
language can operate very effectively. 
When we move from obsezvation, direct sensation, to relation-
ships, meanings, interpretations, comprehensions, no one can go far 
in any field without language: "Words are the meeting points at 
which regions of experience which can never combine in sensation 
or intuition come together."42 
If people in the humanities have any advantage in this matter-
and I am not sure they do, though one would think their situation 
ought to give them some- it is that they know that in language is 
their meaning, that language is where whatever they are or have or 
do, is. That is why, whatever else we do, we believe that we must 
continue to give close attention to interpreting the text--that is what 
we have to work with. Others, it seems to us, sometimes think they, 
in contrast, are working with real things, rather than merely verbaliz-
ing: and they therefore either function unselfconsciously in their 
language situations-which functioning is all to the good so long 
as it works, which is most of the time in our routine situations, even 
when our routine situations are highly specialized and complex- or 
when they do experience a problem, think that it is lack of a skill 
in something separable and that by seeking out a coach or someone 
to hold them upright while they point and pedal, they can restore their 
feel for riding their bicycle of language which they seem to have lost 
for the moment, though they of course know perfectly well what 
it is they want to put down for the record, if they can just find the 
words that will fit whatever it is that they already know. 
If it is a riddle how he functions with it, man's language is no 
jesting matter, but an essential source of whatever glory he has. 
There is not something wrong but something right with man that he 
cannot reduce himself, his experiences, his meanings, his significances, 
to that which can be symbolized in a binary number system. Language 
is his means of developing his human responses: 
4~SO Much N earer, p. 171, Richards quoting a passage he had written 
earlier in Phiiosolill), of Rhetoric. 
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Bad taste and crude responses are not mere flaws in an otherwise 
admirable person. They are actually a root evil from which other 
defects follow. No life can be excellent in which the elementary re-
sponses are disorganized and confused.43 
An improvement of response is the only benefit which anyone can 
receive, and the degradation, the lowering of a response, is the only 
calamity.44 
Developing one's language is not a quick, easy, or simple process, 
though the extent of the young child's miraculous first mastery some-
times causes us to take further development for granted. Our language 
must grow if the rest of us is to continue to do so, and the process 
is neither easy, automatic, nor rapid. "An original poem, as much as a 
new branch of mathematics, compels the mind which receives it to 
grow, and this takes time."45 
It may be true that there are those "who, having never been 
troubled by thought, have never found any difficulty in expressing 
it,"4G but we need to understand for ourselves, and to help our 
students to see for themselves, that to have trouble with an expres-
sion may well indicate that we really are thinking newly, instead of 
merely reviewing. 
Whenever difficulties arise in a real language situation, so close 
is language to us that we tend to take the whole matter personally, and 
say either that there is something wrong with us, as some students, 
unfortunately, tend to do after a little unsuccessful wrestling with a 
new comprehending, or that there is something wrong- useless, 
uninteresting, etc.-with the utterance, or the utterer; or we other-
wise slide away from the difficulties. Even when we wholeheartedly 
accept the challenge, it seems as if the learning difficulties are with 
the material, or the vocabulary (in the sense of simply learning new 
word lists) or with our lack of previous experience; and human 
development may be concerned with all of these. But always, as a 
total process, the concern finally must be with the development of 
43Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 62. 
44Ibid., p. 237. 
45Ibid., p. 29l. 
46Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, p. 242. 
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ourselves and our control of our thought, through the development 
within us of our language. 
Regarding metaphor, and its overwhelming importance in its 
influence on how we look at things, it will be important over the next 
several years, if not forever, to particularly cherish our organic, growth 
metaphors: to continue to have branches of learning and not just 
compartments of knowledge; to get at the root of a matter, not just 
down to the nitty-gritty; to create new insights, and not just take a 
look at what it all adds up to; to nourish the mind so it will grow, 
and not just program it so it will retrieve. 
No matter how one defines man, as rational animal or child of 
God, as a little superior to the beasts or a little lower than the angels, 
he to an extent still unplumbed by any of us and undreamed-of by 
most of us, is what his language has made of him and what he has 
made of his language. His speech createth as well as betrayeth him. 
Language in action takes us right down into whatever it is we 
are, where we both lose ourselves and meet ourselves coming around 
every corner we try to tum. It is not, finally, anything separable from 
us. Language is not a code: it is an organ- the supreme organ of 
the mind's self-ordering growth. 
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